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1. Introduction
This paper analyses market positioning by firms, in terms of market niches, distance
from the technological frontier and dispersion.  It explores whether the strategy of
market positioning differs between incumbents and entrants and whether it depends
on the nature of the competition and firm capabilities.
The empirical work focuses on the switch industry, a sub-market of the Local Area
Network (LAN) industry in the 1993-1999 period. During this period, the switch
market has experienced a rapid and sustained growth accompanied by new product
entry due mainly to a very fast rate of technical change. We employ data from an
original dataset of LAN equipment and firms, consisting of 704 new products
marketed between 1993 and 1999. We develop indicators of distance among firms in
the product space, product dispersion and distance of firms from the quality frontier.
These indicators are then regressed against a set of explanatory variables, which aim
to capture the nature of the competition and firm capabilities.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the existing literature
on product differentiation. Section 3 provides some background information on the
technological evolution of the switch market and Section 4 describes the indicators
and the variables that are used in the empirical work. Section 5 presents the result
and provides interpretation in terms of the nature of the competition and firm
capabilities. Section 6 concludes and highlights the limitations of the analysis.
2. The Determinants of Product Differentiation
Economic theory looks at product differentiation as a means for firms to compete on
other grounds than mere price competition, allowing them to enjoy Schumpeterian
rents from their temporary monopoly. In itself, product differentiation is usually3
analysed in terms of location in a product and/or characteristics space. If prices are
given, then the traditional Hotelling (1929) results hold according to which, in
equilibrium, firms tend to locate products ‘back to back’ in the middle of a linear
product spectrum. If however firms first locate and then compete in prices, there is
the tendency to locate products away from each other (Shaked and Sutton, 1982).
Two main factors influence product differentiation: the size of the product space and
market contestability. When the size of the product space is large, firms attempt to
appropriate parts of the demand, which is left unsatisfied, by entering into
unexplored segments of the market. Conversely when size is given, market
contestability prevails. High contestability implies that the threat from potential
entrants may persuade incumbents to introduce close substitutes for existing
products in order to prevent firm entry. Incumbents with high market shares are
likely to suffer from market contestability more than other firms because of the
reduction in demand for existing product resulting from the introduction of their
own substitutes. This phenomena has been referred to as cannibalisation (Spence,
1976; Eaton and Lipsey, 1979).
Evidence in favour of cannibalisation is unclear. In the ready-to-eat cereal industry,
incumbents have been found to employ product proliferation strategy to fill existing
niches before entrants (Schmalensee, 1978). Looking at the PC industry over the 1981-
1992 period, Bayus and Putsis (1999) found no evidence of such a strategy.  The
reasons for this mixed evidence are at least twofold. First, the extent of firm product
diversification is likely to affect the choice of location. Product diversification in other
markets may be a better strategy than proliferation when firms have not yet
diversified (Bonanno, 1987; Bhatt, 1987) in order to spread their risky activities in
several markets. Second, product introduction as analysed by economic theory has4
put much emphasis on where firms are driven to by factors such as market size and
contestability. It has questioned less the capacity of firms to introduce innovative
products in specific segments. Arguably, firm competencies as a whole may be
powerful determinants of product location, other than market size and contestability.
This has been repeatedly argued by the resource-based theory of the firm (Penrose,
1959) in general, and the evolutionary theory of the firm in particular.
The evolutionary theory of the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982) is grounded on the
very idea that firms make what they can rather than making what they want. This is
due to the fact that the accumulation of productive knowledge is highly path
dependent. Newly acquired knowledge at any point in time is a function of the firm
knowledge base accrued in previous periods. As a result, knowledge accumulation
takes inherently the form of successive small steps on related technological
competencies rather than the form of stochastic moves across unrelated technological
competencies (Teece, et al., 1994; Breschi et al., 2003). More generally, the
evolutionary theory of the firm puts much emphasis on the fact that firms are
composed of heterogeneous knowledge and competencies, the exploitation and
exploration of which is non-random and non-obvious, but above all non-immediate.
An additional argument for bounded opportunities for firms rests on the idea that
the product space is inherently rugged (Levinthal, 1997). This is due to the fact that
technologies form complex systems, that is, product components cluster around
specific product architectures and a change in one the component may imply
changes in other components within the architecture or changes in the architecture
itself (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Thus, what could appear as a small move for the
firm may embody radical alterations of its technical competencies. In this context,
previous experience with a specific market and/or technology may also be a source5
of organisational inertia. It may also prevent established firms from understanding
emerging customer needs and enter into new markets (Christensen and Rosenbloom,
1995). Technology race models predict that incumbents enjoy either an advantage
over entrants (Gilbert and Newberry, 1982) or a disadvantage (Reinganum, 1983)
depending on whether the design of new products represents incremental
improvements of existing ones or a radical departure respectively.
The above implies that the mere identification of a new market opportunity
represents only half the challenge. Firms must be able to modify their limited range
of productive capabilities in order to introduce a supposedly more successful
product.  They do this in various ways: by renewing their human capital; by
investing in new, more productive equipment; by undertaking systematic research
activities; by identifying new suppliers or partners; by exploiting their
complementary assets in a novel or more efficient way (Teece, 1986; Mitchell, 1989).
For example, production and sales experience in existing markets provide firms with
the possibility to compete efficiently in a related market niche by reducing entry
costs (Klepper and Simons, 2000; King and Tucci, 2002). Within this context,
incumbents may have advantages over entrants. In her study of product location in
the PC market, Stavins (1995) finds that established firms disperse more their
products along the spectrum benefiting from learning and economies of scope.
Looking at the automobile industry, Thomas and Weigelt (2000) find that incumbents
and large firms use their experience to locate new products close to their existing
ones and away from those of the rivals.
On the basis of the above discussion, we expect product location to reflect the nature
of the competition, i.e. the size of the product space and market contestability, but
also firm capabilities. In particular, we expect incumbents to have followed a6
segmentation strategy and move incrementally in the product space. This is because
incumbents can rely on past experience, leaving entrants to fill more distant and less
crowded niches. However, we expect incumbents to produce a larger product line
and disperse their products in the product space more than entrants to possibly deter
entry. Finally, we expect incumbents that produce close substitutes to locate in the
high-end segment where customer preference for availability of complementary
products, post marketing assistance and availability of continuous training tends to
protect them from competition from new firms. Entrants would instead focus on new
customers and locate their products in the low-end segment.
3. The Dynamics of the LAN Industry
We study the strategy of location in the product space by incumbents and entrants in
the switch market. Switches are part of the infrastructure that constitutes Local Area
Networks (LANs). Together with other types of equipment with which they have to
interoperate they are employed by users to send and receive data packets. Switches
were introduced in the context of data communication in 1990, first as a solution to
congestion problems that existing equipment (i.e. hubs) could not deal with.
Switches experienced a rapid diffusion in the first half of the last decade mainly as a
consequence of the expansion of local networks and subsequently of the early
diffusion of client server architectures within firms.
LANs are technical systems made up of different components (both hardware and
software) that are combined to form an infrastructure to enable users located
physically close to one another to send data and/or share common resources such as
printers and other types of peripherals. Within the system, different types of
equipment ensure that data transmission occurs: hubs that broadcast the data to7
many users located within a specific segment; switches that send data only to the
user(s) that is supposed to receive it; routers which are able to choose the shortest
path to destination and embed additional management and security functions that
switches do not have. In addition to the equipment, communications standards set
the ‘rules’ and the speed at which data transmission occurs.
There are four different phases in the evolution of the LAN industry, each of them
characterised by the introduction of new key equipment and the establishment of
one or more specific communication standards.1  The first phase, from the mid-1970s
to mid-1980s, is characterised by the absence of an official communication standard
and the presence of many proprietary solutions marketed by different
manufacturers.  The second phase, from the mid 1980s until the end of the decade,
saw the introduction of hubs and the official standardisation of Ethernet and Token
Ring as communication standards.2 Hubs were introduced mainly to offer a unique
point of concentration within firms in order to rationalise the cabling system. The
third phase from the end of the 1980s until mid 1990s, witnessed the growth of the
hub market and the establishment of Ethernet as the dominant communication
standards for LANs. As more and more nodes were added to the LAN, congestion
increased revealing the shortcomings of hubs in solving new bottlenecks.3 The
introduction of the switch and the emergence of Fast Ethernet as the high-speed
upgrade of Ethernet characterise the fourth phase. From the technological viewpoint,
early switches possessed higher port density (i.e. they could connect more nodes)
                                                     
1 For the period breakdown we follow Christensen et al. (1995)
2 Ethernet was originally developed at the Menlo Park Research Labs in the first half of the 1970s and
had become the standard chosen by Xerox for its internal network. Token Ring was the standard of
choice for IBM based networks. Other proprietary standards existed (i.e. ARCnet and StarLAN). See von
Burg (2001)
3 See Fontana (2003) for an account of the main events that characterised the battle of standardisation of
new high-speed standards.8
than hubs and were capable of forwarding data very fast and only to those nodes
that were necessary, therefore helping to reduce network congestion. Although more
expensive than hubs, switches provided users with additional features.
Interestingly, the emergence and development of switches coincided with the entry
of three types of manufacturers. First, incumbents from within the LAN industry
(both from the router and the hub market). Cisco, the future dominant firm in the
switch market, came from the router market and was among the early firms to enter.
More hesitant incumbents in the hub market (3Com, Bay Networks, DEC) were
constrained by their previous investments as well as by the risk of cannibalising their
installed base.4 Second, incumbents from outside the industry but with previous
experience either in the telecom industry or in the semiconductor industry. Third,
start-ups searching for new opportunities, especially when the outcome of the battle
for standardisation was still surrounded by uncertainty.
The growth of the switch market is related to the developments in the equipment
design. The first was the change in the design of the equipment following the
transition to RISC and ASICs based architectures that occurred in the middle of the
1990s. This development enabled high economies of scale to be obtained in the
production of switches and to achieve higher forwarding speed, support more nodes
and reduce delays in transmission. The second was support for new functionalities
that improved data management and made switches more sophisticated and similar
to routers. As a result of these events, in the second half of the 1990s, two segments
opened up in the switch market. The high-end switches, characterised by high port
                                                     
4 Threatened by new competition, hub manufacturers responded with a strategy of incremental
improvements to existing product architectures to manage the transition to the new phase. However,
this strategy based on the modular upgrading of existing equipment proved ineffective to contrast the
diffusion on switches. Brusoni and Fontana (2004) provide a detailed analysis of the benefits and
shortcoming of this strategy.9
density and high performance, are targeted to customers with large networks. The
low-end switches are low cost and generally less performing, support only one
standard and are targeted to customers with small networks.
Importantly, the nature of the competition in the two types of market segments is
different. In the low-end segment, manufacturers compete mainly on price.  In the
high-end segment, competition is usually influenced by the presence of substantial
switching costs for customers. Switching costs derive mainly from the need to
purchase equipment that is compatible with existing switches, and from the cost of
learning to use equipment purchased from different manufacturers. Since
communication standards are open, in theory customers can mix-and-match
equipment from different manufacturers in the same network. However, switches
need software programmes to function and manufacturers often design proprietary
software that makes the equipment  incompatible with that of other manufacturers.5
This practice has implications both for adoption choice and the strategy of product
introduction by manufacturers.
On the demand side, previous investments in both hardware and software of specific
manufacturers gives a strong incentive for users to continue to buy compatible
equipment from the same manufacturer, in order to avoid incurring the extra costs of
switching. In a survey of the determinants of switch choice by users, Forman and
Chen (2004) find evidence that the presence of an installed base of equipment from a
particular manufacturer increases the likelihood of repurchasing from the same
vendor if the customer decides to buy again. These issues become particularly
important in the case of technologically sophisticated equipment such as high-end
                                                     
5 This is the case for instance of the Spectrum network management software developed by Cabletron,
the Cisco Fusion architecture first and then the Internet Operating Systems (IOS) software developed by
Cisco (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002).10
switches used in large networks of hundreds to thousand of users. Within these
networks, costs for moving and adding new users are very high. Connecting and
setting-up new configurations as well as troubleshooting are particularly
complicated and software that works for specific equipment may not work with
others (Christensen et al., 1995).
On the supply side, manufacturers can exploit the presence of high switching costs to
lock-in customers and compete against rivals. Relying on an existing installed base,
manufacturers may strategically set the timing of new product introduction in order
to force customers to buy upgrades. Moreover, manufacturers tend to introduce
families of products that work well together. These families typically include devices
of different densities, configurations and supporting different communication
standards so as to be able to target the entire demand spectrum (i.e. going ‘end-to-
end’) and/or to prevent rivals from entering specific niches. All major manufactures
in the switch industry followed this strategy.6
The structure of the switch market has always been concentrated although less than
that of other markets within the LAN industry (i.e. routers). In 1994, the four biggest
firms in the market (Cisco (Kalpana), 3Com (Synernetics), Alantec and Chipcom)
accounted for 94% of revenue share. In the 2nd quarter of 1999, the last year of our
sample period, the share of the four biggest companies had fallen to 81% with Cisco
maintaining the lead at 47%, followed by 3Com, Nortel Networks (Bay Networks)
and Cabletron.7
                                                     
6 In 1994 Cisco offered the first product of its Catalyst line of Switch equipment that will be enriched in
the following years by many other high-end as well as low-end equipment. 3Com responded with the
Superstack and Office Connect line of equipment, the former targeting big users, the latter customers
with smaller networks. Also the other two big incumbents, Bay Networks and Cabletron, marketed an
entire product line, the BayStack and Smartswitch respectively.
7 Sources: The Yankee Group (Network World: October 31, 1994). 1999 (2qt): Dell’Oro Group (Network
World: October 18, 1999: p.30)11
4. Data and Measurements
The data used in this paper consist of information on product characteristics and
prices of switches and hubs. They come from an original dataset of 1071 LAN
products (535 hubs and 536 switches marketed between 1990-1999 and 1993-1999
respectively). The dataset was constructed using information from specialised trade
journals (Network World and Data Communications) that periodically publish details
on new product introductions. This information has also been double checked,
whenever possible, with press communications and product announcements
released by manufacturers themselves.
In the original dataset there are 199 different manufacturers. For the purpose of our
analysis, we decided to consider only those manufacturers who marketed four or
more products in the period 1990-1999. After consolidation we were left with 82
firms and a subset of 704 products in total (464 switches and 240 hubs). As we can
determine product location only when firms do innovate, the number of observations
in the sample, i.e. firms introducing at least one product for a given year in the
switch market, is 176.
For each product the dataset reports information on its technical characteristics, date
of market introduction and list price. The chosen time span fully covers the year of
development and growth of the switch market as well as the years of consolidation
and decline of the hub market. By stopping in 1999 this analysis only partially
accounts for the most recent period of the evolution of the switch market
characterised by the entry of telecom companies.  Since most of these firms produce
for the high-end part of the market our data may lead to an underestimation of the
impact of entrants on the location in this segment.12
Figure I shows the pattern of new product introduction for both switches and hubs
between 1993 and 1999.
{Figure I Approximately Here}
Dependent variables
We represent the location of product in a vertical or horizontal space using the
generic technological characteristics of the products in the switch market and
measuring distances across products. There is no authoritative way of measuring
distances across products. The most challenging aspect of this analysis is deciding
how products can be benchmarked. Following Stavins (1995), we do it in two steps.
In the first step, we reduce the multi-attribute structure (the technological
characteristics) to a single dimensional measure of product quality.  Assuming







jm j m z q β (1)
Eq.(1) suggests that the quality q of model m can be measured as the weighted sum of
its characteristics. The weights ￿j  represent the marginal value of characteristics j
that both consumers and producers place on the jth attribute.  Such weights ￿j are
approximated by regressing observed prices, deflated into 1996 US dollars using the
Implicit Price Deflator provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, on product characteristics:
() mit
j
jm j t mit z P ε β α α + ⋅ + + =  ln (2)
where α is a constant and  t α is a time fixed effect. Table I provides the results from
the hedonic regression. With 70% of the variance of prices explained, the overall fit is13
satisfactory enough although a substantial part of the observed prices (30%) is due to
factors other than those introduced in the regression. This may in turn be due to
omitted product attributes and erroneous pricing reflecting changes in demand.
{Table I Approximately Here}
In Table I, the estimated weights are constrained to be constant over time, whereas
the technology in the Switch market is likely to have evolved over time. This
suggests that depending on significant changes in product quality in the nineties, the
pooled regression may produce inexact weights. We performed separate hedonic
regressions in order to test for parameter equality over time by means of a Chow test.
All years differ significantly and thus separate hedonic regressions were performed
to produce ￿jt instead of ￿j. These are used to calculate q, the predicted price by
hedonic regressions. Whereas the observed prices embody error measurements
reflecting various factors such as changes in demand, promotional discounts and
other non-quality components (see Stavins, 1995), the predicted price q reflects by
construction the quality of the product. Ranking these prices is tantamount to
ranking products according to their quality.
In the second step, we use the predicted price q to compute distances across product.
We start by considering horizontal product differentiation by computing the mean
Weitzman distance 
c
























where  1 − t N is the number of products at year t - 1,  mit q is the quality of model m by
firm i in year t and  1 − t , n q  is the quality of model n in year t – 1. This product space14
can be thought of as a circle in which products locate. The further from centre c of the
circle, the more peculiar the product is from the representative product. Because
firms can introduce several products in a given year, we calculated for every firm
and every year the average distance 
c
it d . Alternatively, we use the predicted price q
to rank products on a vertical product space. To do so, we compute for every product
its distance from the quality frontier as follows:
() mit it
f
mit q q d − = max (4)
where  mit q is the quality of model m by firm i in year t. The higher 
f
mit d , the farther
the product is from the quality frontier. Again, because firms can introduce several
products in a given year, we computed for each firm the lowest distance from the
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The last measure deals with product dispersion in order to test the proposition that
incumbents spread their product over a wider range of the product space. We
develop a measure of product dispersion in two steps (Stavins, 1995). In the first step,
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The relative dispersion index is defined as the ratio of the two dispersion measures







Figure II plots the mean relative dispersion index by firm age. It seems that firm age
between 2 and 6 years on the switch or hubs market does not impact on the
dispersion of the product. However widening the age range from 1 to 7 years
suggests a positive and non-linear relation between firm age and product dispersion.
{Figure II Approximately Here}
Independent variables
Consistent with the empirical literature, we distinguish between entrants and
incumbents as a main determinant of innovative strategies for product location.
Additionally, we argue that product location is a function of two main factors: the
nature of the competition and firm capabilities. We decompose the notion of
competition into two components: the size of the product space and market
contestability. First, like Khanna (1995), we use Eq.(4) to develop a measure of the
size of the product space as follows:
















where M is the number of products at year t – 1 and  mit q is the quality of model m by
firm i in year t. Eq.(8) has the lowest value of zero, which in this case means that the
average distance is null and that all products introduced in a given year compete
with the same characteristics. This measure is also informative about the intensity of
the competition between firms. With a shrinking measure, the market is
concentrating around a dominant quality and thus firms compete in a narrower16
product space. With a growing measure, the market is expanding with the
introduction in the product space of novel product quality.
{Figure III Approximately Here}
Figure III plots the computed measures of the product space for both the hub and
switch markets. We observe two successive waves: the hub market, after having
expanded until 1995, has been constantly concentrating around a narrower
technological space; the switch market is still expanding, thus leaving room for
potential entrants to enter into the market.  This is in line with our appreciative
knowledge that the former is technologically older than  the latter. Second, we





where E and F are the number of entrants and the total number of firms, respectively.
This represents an ex post measure of market contestability based on the entrant
counts, as opposed to ex ante measures such as, for example, barriers to entry. When
the number of entrants is high, the ratio () F E  is high and therefore, market
contestability is supposedly high. This variable varies between 0 and 1. A value close
to unity indicates high contestability by entrants, whereas a low value indicates low
contestability.8 Figure IV plots the accumulated number of firms F and the number of
entrants E per year. The number of entrants increase until 1995 and drop to zero in
1998 stabilising the number of firms in the switch market to around 80 from 1997
onwards.
                                                     
8 We do not have information on product and/or firm exit, so that the number of firms does not account
for manufacturers who decided to leave the industry. As a consequence, this variable may overestimate
the effect of barrier to entry on our indicators of product location.17
{Figure IV Approximately Here}
Before turning to the issue of measuring firm capabilities, it is interesting to graph
the number of product innovations by types of innovator (see Figure V).  It shows
that rapidly, incumbents play a major role in innovative activities in the switch
market, since from 1995 onward, most innovations were introduced by firms
competing on the switch market for at least a year.
{Figure V Approximately Here}
Firm capabilities range from technological competencies to capabilities in
complementary activities such as distribution and commercialisation.  We measure
these capabilities with the number of years for which the firm has been active in the
switch market. Arguably, this should control for firm experience in both core
competencies and complementary assets. In a similar fashion, we test the presence of
economies of scope by controlling for firm experience in the hub market.  Firms may
benefit from their experience in distinctive yet related markets, which in turn may
potentially influence the capacity of firms to enter and locate in particular segments
of the switch market.
6. Results
We model product location in terms of distance from market centre, distance from
technological frontier and dispersion as a function of the nature of the competition
(technological competition and barriers to entry) and firm experience in the Switch
(incumbents versus entrants and firm experience in the switch and hub markets).
Additional explanatory variables are included to control for a time trend and firm
fixed effects. The results of OLS regressions are displayed in Tables II to IV. In each
model, we use several specifications to control for the robustness of the results.18
Because of the small number of observations (N = 176 for Tables II to IV) and the
unbalanced nature of the panel, the inclusion of firm dummy variables is limited to
those firms innovating for at least five years.
Table II presents the results of the analysis of product location in the switch market.
Five models have been estimated using the mean Weitzman distance as a dependent
variable. In each of the proposed models we sequentially introduce a new set of
independent variables. Model (1) only takes into account whether the firm has
previously introduced a switch while models (2) and (3) look at the impact on firm
location choice of technological competition, marker structure and previous
experience in the switch and/or the hub market. We find a negative and significant
coefficient of the incumbent variable suggesting that established firms tend to locate
their new products close to existing ones.
{Table II Approximately Here}
In model (2) we introduce the variables of the nature of the competition: the size of
product space and market contestability. We lag these variables one period in order
to account for their influence at the time when firm decisions occur. The positive and
significant sign of the former suggests that, as the product space expands, firms
introduce less close substitutes for existing products. In a context of expanding
opportunities for product location this strategy is consistent with entry deterrence
behaviour as predicted by Brander and Eaton (1984). Consistent with the result of
Stavins (1995), market contestability enters positively, suggesting that the threat of
new entrants leads firms to saturate the product space by locating new products far
from existing ones. These results hold after controlling for additional factors such as
firm capabilities (Model 3), time trend (Model 4) and unobserved heterogeneity
between the most innovative firms (Model 5).19
In model (3) we look at the influence of previous experience in the same and/or
related markets and technologies. The coefficient of Experience in Switch is positive
although not significant, whereas the coefficient of Experience in the Hub market is
negative and significant. This suggests that the more experience firms have in this
related market the more they tend to locate their switches in crowded areas of the
product space. Previous experience in a related market reinforces a segmentation
strategy in the switch market using their existing distribution channels, assistance
and training to serve the new customers. Moreover, for a hub maker, producing
switches means producing a distant substitute for their products. The choice of
locating close to other switch manufactures could be the consequence of a strategy
aimed at filling empty spaces before competitors do in order to preserve customers.
Overall, these results show that established firms cluster their products in a relatively
narrow and crowded portion of the product space (they segment). It implies that
firms do not expect intense price competition either from existing rivals or from
entrants given that, by producing more distant substitutes for existing products,
incumbents might effectively deter entry by new firms. We question whether, in a
context of market expansion, this type of behaviour depends on the pattern of
demand and the presence of high switching costs for users. If there are different
categories of customers who, as argued in Section 3, have to sustain high costs of
switching between manufacturers, then location in the product space becomes less a
strategic decision for incumbents. Firms may produce close substitutes without
worrying about price cuts from rivals or increasing competition from entrants.
Table III displays the results of the determinants of location in the vertical product
space. Here the dependent variable is the lowest distance of each firm from the
quality frontier (
f
it d ), whereas the set of independent variables is identical to that of20
Table II.  Model (7) looks at the influence of the type of innovator and market
structure on firm location. The sign of Incumbents is negative and significant,
suggesting that established firms locate close to the frontier, i.e. incumbents target
the high-end of the market, whereas entrants produce for the low-end. The sign of
Incumbents does not change when controlling for other factors although it becomes
insignificant (Models 8 to 10).
The negative and significant coefficient of Size of Product Space indicates that the
expansion of the product space increases technological opportunities to locate new
products close to the frontier (i.e. target the high-end market). The negative and
significant coefficient of Market Contestability suggests instead that the threat from
entrants leads firms to locate far from the frontier (i.e. target the low-end market).
Overall, these results depict a situation in which opportunities to cater for high-end
customer increase as the market grows but are seized mainly by incumbents. Since
incumbents tend to segment, as shown in Table II, we conclude that they tend to
cluster their products mainly in the high-end segment.
{Table III Approximately Here}
Results from models (6) and (7) suggest that entrants target mainly low-end
customers, implying that entrants do not leapfrog incumbents. The reasons for this
are threefold. First, because incumbents saturate high-end segments of the market,
there is little demand left for entrants. Second, evidence on adoption behaviour in the
switch industry shows that unattached users focus on the low-end segments (Forman
and Chen, 2004). Third, as argued in Section 3, the presence of barriers to entry in the
form of economies of scale in production discourages new firms from entering at all
in the market. The above remarks are reinforced when we focus on firm experience
in the switch – and related – markets.21
Experience in Switch has a negative sign suggesting that as experience grows
incumbents continue to focus on the high-end segment, whereas Experience in Hub
is positive and significant, indicating that the higher the previous experience in the
hub market the more firms position their products far from the frontier. These results
are in broad agreement with the evolutionary theory of the firm, where the
distinctive skills of firms in a high technology industry such as the switch market are
related to their core technological competencies. Moreover, although hub makers
could leverage on complementary assets, they did not possess the required
technological competencies to manufacture high-end products.
Finally, we analyse product innovation in terms of product dispersion. Table IV
presents the results of the Relative Dispersion Index  (RDI, Eq. 7) as a function of the
type of innovator, the nature of the competition and firm experience. Most
coefficients are not significant, the most robust result being the positive and
significant sign of Incumbents across all the models (11)-(15). This suggests that
incumbents disperse their products more than entrants. It is consistent with the
presence of demand side switching costs that give an advantage to firms who market
full product lines. Market Contestability has a negative sign suggesting that the
threat from entrants provides impetus for incumbents to saturate the product space
and engage in several segments of the market. This result is consistent with those of
Table II where we argued that the presence of many firms in the market reduces the
space for locating new products and reduces the incentive to disperse new models.
{Table IV Approximately Here}22
Finally, we note that none of the variables capturing firm experience on product
dispersion are significant.9 This result suggests the absence of learning effects in
explaining the behaviour of incumbents and reinforces the evidence that dispersion
is mainly a consequence of the presence of demand side switching costs.
7. Conclusion
This paper has investigated the determinants of product location in the switch
equipment industry. Two issues have been at stake: whether firms followed a
specific strategy when introducing a new product; and whether previous experience
with the same and/or related technology influenced the location decision.
Concerning the first point, our analysis found that incumbents and entrants followed
different product location strategies. We did not find evidence of a strategic pre-
emptive behaviour by incumbents, such as entering empty market niches.  On the
contrary, the overall results of the analysis of product location with respect to
competing firms suggest that in this market incumbents have a tendency to segment.
We also found that incumbents tend to segment in a specific portion of the switch
market, namely the high-end. We interpret this evidence on the basis of the presence
of demand side switching costs that shelter firms from (the reaction of) rivals and
competition from entrants. The influence of demand side switching costs on product
location choice is confirmed also by the choice of incumbents to disperse their
product more in the product spectrum (i.e. they introduce wide product lines).
Instead, entrants disperse less.
                                                     
9 One could argue that the reason for the non-significance of the variables related to firm capabilities is
its co-linearity with the variable “Incumbents”. These results hold even when regressing RDI on firm
capabilities only.23
Concerning the second point, we found mixed evidence on the role of past
experience on firm location choice. On the one hand, previous experience gained in
related markets reinforces segmentation, especially in the case of firms targeting the
low-end of the market. On the other hand, previous experience acquired in the same
market does not affect the choice of product location. There seems to be a
discontinuity in location in the high-end segment. Being an incumbent represents an
advantage, but this advantage does not depend on past experience.
Overall, our results indicate that the nature of competition differs whether you are an
entrant or an incumbent. For entrants, competition consists of a succession of moves,
aimed at climbing the ladder from the low-end to the high-end segments. In order to
reach the top-end of the market, a firm must accumulate experience first, being active
in another related market for instance, and exploit it subsequently. For incumbents,
competition consists in securing their position, by occupying the high-end of the
market first and then saturating the product space. These types of behaviour coexist
and plead in favour of the idea that firm type and, albeit in a less systematic way,
firm capabilities also explain product location. Other strategic determinants of firm
location such as market contestability and market size, although important, do not
seem to be equally relevant to explain product differentiation in this industry.
The results of this paper capture stylised facts emerging from empirical analyses of
the evolution of the switch industry. Although they are still preliminary, they are
consistent with some of the predictions of the existing theoretical literature on
product location (Brander and Eaton, 1984) and entry deterrence in the presence of
switching costs (Klemperer, 1995; Farrell and Shapiro, 1988). Finally, they also point
to the importance of firm resources and capabilities in determining location choice
and of market competition in boosting technical change.24
Our results are subject to a number of limitations, mainly related to a lack of
additional information on switch products. The most immediate is the absence of
data on product sales. From the econometric viewpoint, the above estimations
should weight each observation, i.e.  product, by its sales. From the theoretical
viewpoint, product sales provide firms with market power, which in turn should
prove influential in their strategy. The other issue concerns product exit. In markets
where exit is frequent, market structure is highly affected by product exit. Our study
should extend the analyses of product location to product exit, as is the case  in
Stavins’ (1995) analysis. The combined availability of product sales and exit would
enable us to study the relationship between product location and product sales and
exit. The last limitation concerns the difficulty to gather additional information on
firms themselves in order to measure firm competencies in a more articulated way.
Future work will explore ways of connecting unsystematic yet existing financial data
on firms with information on firm patenting activity. Although challenging, the
connection of these various datasets with the one explored in this paper should
prove particularly fruitful in elucidating product location in highly turbulent
markets.25
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TABLE I
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION ON HEDONIC PRICES
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DEFLATED PRODUCT PRICE
0.239 Backplane Capacity
[0.038]***
0.088 Number of Ethernet Ports
[0.029]***
0.029 Number of Fast Ethernet Ports
[0.038]
0.030 Number of FDDI Ports
[0.060]
0.129 Number of Token Ring Ports
[0.045]***
0.259 Number of 100VG-AnyLAN Ports
[0.109]**
0.120 Number of ATM Ports
[0.044]***













Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Year dummy variables omitted for clarity.33
TABLE II
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ON THE LOCATION OF INNOVATIONS IN THE SWITCH
PRODUCT SPACE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: MEAN WEITZMAN DISTANCE.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.118 -0.196 -0.256 -0.193 -0.172
Incumbents [0.069]* [0.085]** [0.114]** [0.109]* [0.109]
0.255 0.241 0.196 0.198
Size of Product Space (t – 1) [0.103]** [0.097]** [0.088]** [0.089]**
0.090 0.082 1.295 1.311
Market Contestability (t – 1) [0.204] [0.211] [0.645]** [0.653]**
0.059 0.033 0.012
Experience in Switch [0.062] [0.059] [0.070]
-0.046 -0.049 -0.040
Experience in Hub [0.023]** [0.024]** [0.028]
0.311 0.321
Trend [0.144]** [0.153]**
Firm Fixed effect No No No No Yes
Observations 176 176 176 176 176
R-squared 0.017 0.099 0.126 0.163 0.189
Log-L -105.5 -97.8 -95.1 -91.4 -88.5
Intercept not reported. Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%34
TABLE III
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ON THE LOCATION OF INNOVATIONS IN THE SWITCH
PRODUCT SPACE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DISTANCE FROM QUALITY FRONTIER
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
0.035 -0.477 -0.328 -0.309 -0.352
Incumbents [0.196] [0.219]** [0.275] [0.281] [0.275]
-0.570 -0.544 -0.558 -0.539
Size of Product Space (t – 1) [0.261]** [0.248]** [0.241]** [0.233]**
-2.264 -2.190 -1.812 -1.744
Market Contestability (t – 1) [0.494]*** [0.499]*** [1.542] [1.533]
-0.187 -0.195 -0.086
Experience in Switch [0.114] [0.115]* [0.129]
0.189 0.189 0.242
Experience in Hub [0.058]*** [0.058]*** [0.061]***
0.097 0.045
Trend [0.354] [0.353]
Firm Fixed Effect No No No No Yes
Observations 176 176 176 176 176
R-squared 0.000 0.129 0.182 0.183 0.298
Log-L -291.7 -279.6 -274.0 -273.9 -260.6
Intercept not reported. Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%35
TABLE IV
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ON THE DISPERSION OF INNOVATIONS IN THE SWITCH
PRODUCT SPACE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: RELATIVE DISPERSION INDEX
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
0.221 0.250 0.246 0.292 0.327
Incumbents [0.065]*** [0.090]*** [0.119]** [0.121]** [0.123]***
-0.003 -0.006 -0.039 -0.044
Size of Product Space (t – 1) [0.094] [0.097] [0.098] [0.095]
0.084 0.095 0.982 0.961
Market Contestability (t – 1) [0.157] [0.165] [0.576]* [0.587]
-0.005 -0.024 -0.089
Experience in Switch [0.044] [0.048] [0.060]
0.014 0.012 -0.009
Experience in Hub [0.022] [0.022] [0.025]
0.227 0.255
Trend [0.146] [0.150]*
Firm Fixed effect No No No No Yes
Observations 176 176 176 176 176
R-squared 0.053 0.056 0.058 0.075 0.191
Log-L -112.6 -112.3 -112.1 -110.5 -98.7
Intercept not reported. Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%